

THE AZIMUTH

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TRAINING FEEDBACK BULLETIN OF THE ARNG BCTC

The Azimuth, the official training feedback publication of the Army National Guard (ARNG) Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, provides detailed training feedback focused on ARNG battalions participating in Battalion Staff Training Program (BSTP) exercises.

This issue, the premiere edition, announces the Battalion Staff Training Program (BSTP) and the quality feedback provided in each issue. Battalion participation in BSTP begins in January. *The Azimuth* will be published quarterly.

This issue highlights the BCTC, the BSTP, the Battalion Staff Training Team (BSTT), and sample training feedback in the areas of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I).

The Azimuth is an official publication of the ARNG BCTC, 8 Sherman Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027, P: 913.758-5505 web address, www-bctc.army.mil

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From the Director

READINESS IS PRIORITY ONE

*This forward is from the Director of the Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz. His guidance and insight often will accompany editions of *The Azimuth*.*



unthinkable. Our readiness to ensure the security and safety of the American people is truly a clear and present

requirement. My number one priority is readiness...ready at the soldier and leader level, ready to meet the rigors of combat, and ready to meet any challenge to our Nation and our Guard in these tumultuous times.

Are we prepared? Are we trained to accomplish our security and combat requirements? Do we know what tasks must be second nature to every Guardsman to accomplish our combat missions and many others? Do we know where to place our training emphasis? These are challenges that face our entire structure.


We are constrained in our readiness efforts by the ever-challenging availability of training time, so we must be more efficient not only in our training execution but in our feedback as well. *The Azimuth* provides us a feedback mechanism so we can share our lessons learned...so the training lessons of a few can benefit all.

Our Guard is a model example of the unit diversity required to accomplish federal and state missions across the spectrum of combat, combat support, and combat service support missions. National and international events underscore a dependence on our readiness like never before in our history. The threat of terrorist activity on American soil has brought homeland security and homeland defense to all of us in a way here-to-fore

"My number one priority is readiness...ready at the soldier and leader level, ready to meet the rigors of combat, and ready to meet any challenge to our Nation and our Guard."



SUPPORTING THE FORCE THE AZIMUTH



BATTLE COMMAND TRAINING CENTER (BCTC)

Mission

The mission of the BCTC is to provide constructive battle staff training to ARNG units and soldiers through the use of simulations and Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) in coordination with the BCTP.

Vision

The vision of the BCTC is to capitalize on information technology capabilities to assist in creating adaptive commanders, staffs, and leaders who are thoroughly versed in the art and science of war, fully ready and capable of accomplishing all assigned missions.

The BCTC, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the ARNG Center of Excellence for battle staff training. The BCTC is a National Guard Bureau (NGB) Title 10 Field Operating Agency (FOA) and provides the training infrastructure for ARNG units rotating through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The BCTC can conduct two seminars concurrently and annually executes:

- 14 BCBST seminars
- 2 division seminars
- 2 division warfighters
- other priority exercises.

Additionally, the BCTC provides two direct training programs to ARNG battle staffs: the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) Support Team (C4IST) and the BSTP. In support of ARNG battle staff training, the BCTC provides constructive simulation support through JANUS and the OneSAF beta test. Additionally, the BCTC Training Analysis Feedback Team (TAFT) supports training by collecting training information, identifying training trends, and disseminating lessons learned through the BCTC website, the Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and *The Azimuth*.

BATTLE STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM (BSTP)


Mission

This training program conducts battalion battle staff, home-station-based training on a single-mission scenario over two Multiple Unit Training Assembly-5 (MUTA 5) periods. The first MUTA 5 period consists of a battalion battle staff seminar focused on current and emerging doctrine and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The second MUTA 5 period consists of multiple iterations of a JANUS SIMEX to reinforce command training objectives. Resulting training data are sanitized, archived, and analyzed, in order to capture and disseminate good training tips or address trends across the battalion echelon.

The BSTP provides an opportunity to apply warfighting skills in seminars and simulation exercises (SIMEX) for ARNG divisional battalions and other selected missioned units, to help meet FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 requirements to conduct simulation-supported command and staff training. The BSTP is a voluntary, tailored, training program designed to meet unit training needs and objectives. It does so via a BSTT comprised of contractor personnel. The BCTC is capable of executing up to three simultaneous ARNG rotations by combining the efforts of the BSTT, the Distributed Battle Staff Program (DBSP), and unit Commander's Operations and Training Advisors (COTA).



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


BSTP Unit Scheduling


The BSTP schedule is synchronized with the BCTP/ARNG 4-year cycle and developed in conjunction with ARNG scheduling conferences, units (unit COTAs and DCOTAs assist in scheduling), and BCTC Operations. The BSTP's flexibility meets commander's training objectives while recognizing unit scheduling and resource constraints. The priority of scheduling is to:

- battalions scheduled for CONOPS
- other divisional battalions
- divisional battalions scheduled for BCBSTs
- other battalions.

Training Cycle:



Training Rotation:



BATTLE STAFF TRAINING TEAM (BSTT)


Mission

The BSTT conducts realistic, stressful, combined arms training, and leader development for ARNG combat arms divisional battalions and other selected units, to provide trained and ready battalions that can fight and win decisively as part of a brigade or division in contingency operations worldwide.

The BSTT, the execution arm of the BSTP, is comprised of a Chief, three opposing forces (OPFOR) commanders, and three teams, each with one team lead and three contractor Observer/Trainers (O/T). The overall program is capable of executing up to 21 rotations per year. The BSTT is a dedicated team of O/T's with the express mission of assisting battalion staffs in the execution of training during MUTA-5 events. The BSTT normally deploys to the unit and to the nearest DBSP Simulation Center to conduct requested training. Units have the option of deploying to the BCTC to execute a rotation.



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
MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS (MDMP)

A principal focus for the BSTP is the MDMP. Many observations in *The Azimuth* will address the challenging requirements of this critical activity. A few examples follow. *Note: References to FM 101-5 take into consideration on-going doctrinal changes with the publication of FM 6-0 and FM 5-0 (Final Draft, 15 July 2002). FM 6-0 supersedes chapters 1 through 4 and 6, and Appendices G, and I through L of FM 101-5. When published final, FM 5-0 will supersede the rest of FM 101-5.*

Mission Analysis

Observation

Battalion staffs often give in to the urge to rush through the mission analysis process to get at what they view is the core of the orders process.



Discussion


Mission analysis is crucial to the MDMP. It allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualization. Mission analysis is a cross-BOS function led by the S2 and S3 and pulled together by the XO. The results of mission analysis are a definition of the tactical problem and the start of the process of determining feasible solutions. The seventeen steps, many of which occur simultaneously, are:

1. Analyze the higher HQs order.
2. Perform initial IPB.
3. Determine specified, implied, and mission essential tasks.
4. Review available assets.
5. Determine constraints.
6. Identify critical facts and assumptions.
7. Perform risk assessment.
8. Determine IR and initial PIR, FFIR, and CCIR.
9. Determine the initial ISR plan.
10. Update operational timelines.
11. Write the unit mission statement.
12. Deliver a mission analysis briefing.
13. Approve the unit mission statement.
14. Develop the initial commander's intent.
15. Issue the commander's planning guidance.
16. Issue a warning order.
17. Review facts and assumptions.

Failure to get mission analysis right will result in not having the tools prepared to get the most out of the rest of the MDMP.



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Observation

Staffs often do not gather the appropriate tools to initiate the mission analysis process.

Discussion


Situation: The S3 gathers the staff and gives a brief overview of the battalion mission and general guidance on how the operation will unfold. All staff principals are present, supervised by either the S3 or XO. A copy of the battalion order is available but has not been provided to staff personnel to prepare the TOC for planning while the staff receives the order. Many of the recommended tools to begin mission analysis (maps, time lines, worksheets, etc.) are not in place to initiate the mission analysis process in a timely fashion.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Mission Analysis)


-  Turning each step of the MDMP into a standard battle drill will assist in training the staff to provide the commander with the information he/she needs. Staff battle drills reduce confusion, eliminate time loss, and help define the outcomes and products needed to move to the next task.
-  While the tools that can be used to support the mission analysis process are numerous, there are basic ones that all staffs should consider. They are:
 - Large-scale maps of the area of operations, 1:25,000 or larger with graphics
 - A cartoon sketch or representation of the area of operations depicting prominent features, both topographic and man-made
 - Blown-up, laminated mission analysis (MA) briefing boards. The S3 should review each staff worksheet and indicate to the operations sergeant or assistant S3 which tasks, constraints, restrictions, RFIs or other pertinent data that should be posted on the MA boards
 - An enlarged copy of a blank timeline with place holders for light data, enemy and friendly actions
 - Mission analysis worksheets, so when the staff receives the order they can immediately begin filling out their sections
 - Examples of previous products (e.g., MCOO) approved by the commander in both appearance and completeness
-  Each briefer should have a summation slide or statement that says, “Sir, what all this means is....”



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Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Mission Analysis) Cont.

 Identify the outcomes and staff products from each of the mission analysis steps. For example:

Step 2. Conduct IPB.


1. terrain and weather (illumination effects)
2. the enemy (unit size)
3. enemy commander's intent / objective / worst fear
4. enemy course of action (ECOA) development
5. ECOA sketches
6. what we know about the enemy (targeting implications)
7. what we don't know about the enemy (recon implications)
8. what the enemy knows about us (positions, counter-recon)
9. recommended PIR
10. tentative ISR plan.

Step 12. Conduct a mission analysis briefing.

1. initial IPB
 2. current combat power
 3. current situation of subordinate units
 4. current and projected task organization
 5. missions/intents two levels up
 6. specified, implied, and mission essential tasks
 7. limitations (constraints and restrictions)
 8. restated mission
 9. requirements for additional assets
 10. current equipment and classes of supply status
 11. current and projected PERSTAT
 12. medical assets
 13. communications status
 14. commander's guidance
 15. timeline.
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
Course of Action Development

Observation

Battalion staffs are using a combination of deliberate and time-constrained MDMP techniques.

Discussion

While use of the four timesaving techniques addressed in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations* (increased commander involvement, more direct commander's guidance, limited number of friendly and enemy COAs, parallel planning) is often necessary, it can be detrimental to planning if staffs consider the commander's guidance to be a fully developed course of action after minimal refinement by the S3. It is important to have a thorough understanding of the deliberate process before executing the abbreviated process.



Observation

Staff integration during COA development is essential but is generally compartmentalized.

Discussion

When each BOS representative works in his/her separate TOC area and develops his/her portion of the COA, a piecemeal approach that fails to link complementing BOS activities results. Integrating independently prepared staff inputs expends critical time in an already time-constrained process. War-gaming a COA, even though considered fully developed, that has not been fully integrated and synchronized expends more valuable time and will probably meet with commander disapproval.

Observation


The time allotted for COA development is inadequate, and often results in an incomplete COA.

Discussion

Staffs begin war-gaming COAs after sometimes no more than an hour of COA development. The Battalion Executive officer dictates the time allotted, and he must ensure that between the time the commander's guidance is given and war-gaming begins, the staff has been assembled to produce comprehensive, flexible, and complete COAs.



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


☞ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (COA Development)

- ☞ Develop an SOP that focuses on integrating staff COA development and COA analysis. Ensure SOP is clear, concise, and clearly delineates internal duties, responsibilities, and requirements.
- ☞ Ensure SOP highlights required staff tools (i.e., commander's guidance, sketches, staff estimates, enemy templates) and expected products. Products may be a concept sketch and statement detailing a scheme of maneuver and task organization, a subordinate task and purpose, graphics and control measures, etc.
- ☞ Refine COAs prior to wargaming.
- ☞ Consider each BOS when developing COAs.
- ☞ Discuss each phase of a COA by BOS.
- ☞ As each COA is developed, consider:
 - updated IPB
 - possible enemy COAs (event templates)
 - status of own forces
 - restated mission
 - commander's and higher's intent
 - the COA statement and sketch
 - considerations that might affect enemy COAs
 - deductions resulting from a relative combat power analysis
 - why units are arrayed as sketched
 - why selected control measures were used
 - updated facts and assumptions.



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COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I)

Like the MDMP, C4I is a major focus of the BSTP. Following are C4I observations and tactics, techniques, and procedures that will assist units in their training.

Observation

Long delays occur when setting up C4I systems on unit networks

Discussion

Signal officers often do not include C4I systems in their network plans. Specifically, these machine names and internet protocols have to be integrated into a plan and not take a back seat to other network concerns. A delay in accomplishing this integration can be detrimental to sections and units that depend on these systems.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- ☞ Contact sections and units ahead of time to determine specific computer and network requirements.
- ☞ Include C4I machines in the communications plan.
- ☞ Make C4I machines and network considerations a priority during exercise setup.

Observation

The command and control and tracking of BLUFOR dictate the need to have naming convention SOPs for C4I systems.

Discussion

Many units track the friendly situation on maps in the TOC as opposed to digital tracking. While this is an effective method, units employing digital tracking must create C4I system naming standards.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- ☞ Include in unit SOPs those naming conventions that support operational automation requirements.

Observation

Unit SOPs do not adequately facilitate information processing and sharing.

Discussion


The primary means of passing information digitally continues to be via email. This causes a drain on both networks and personnel since information must be handled and moved by both sender and the receiver

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- ☞ Stress the use of web-based dissemination of information
 - ☞ Develop SOPs for the use of file transfer protocols for reporting and web posting.
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Observation

Many units have not yet developed training plans for the use of C4I systems. In many cases plans exist, but they were developed at the last minute and lack proper detail.

Discussion


Training plans and available trainers are key to the successful implementation and use of C4I systems. Command emphasis is required not only to emphasize the use of C4I systems, but in operator training as well.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- ☞ Develop training plans to provide sustainment training.
 - ☞ Schedule “new-user” training to assist newly arrived personnel with C4I systems.
 - ☞ Develop your C4I trainers as SMEs on the subject and maintain their skill level.
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POINTS OF CONTACT

The BSTT and TAFT teams supporting the BSTP program have a combined 400+ years of active Army experience, command at all levels through battalion, staff experience in all BOS areas from battalion through Corps, and Army Combat Training Center (CTC) experience as Observer/Controllers, operations managers, and feedback analysts with every Army CTC.

The Azimuth is not a doctrinal product. It is designed to share training knowledge throughout the ARNG. The tips and techniques offered within are written to help soldiers and trainers execute efficient and effective training at the battalion echelon.